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NOTES 
“YOU MUST CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL 
PYLONS”:  BUILDING A BETTER FRAMEWORK 
FOR ESPORTS GOVERNANCE 
Laura L. Chao* 
 
The popularity of “esports,” also known as “electronic sports” or 
competitive video gaming, has exploded in recent years and captured the 
attention of cord-cutting millennials—often to the detriment of sports such as 
basketball, football, baseball, and hockey.  In the United States, the 
commercial dominance of such traditional sports stems from decades of 
regulatory support.  Consequently, while esports regulation is likely to 
emulate many aspects of traditional sports governance, the esports industry 
is fraught with challenges that inhibit sophisticated ownership and capital 
investment.  Domestic regulation is complicated by underlying intellectual 
property ownership and ancillary considerations such as fluctuations in a 
video game’s popularity. 
Since analogous reform is nigh impossible, nascent governance 
organizations have been created to support the professionalization of esports 
as a new entertainment form.  As esports consumption continues to grow, 
enterprising stakeholders are presented with the unique opportunity to create 
regulatory bodies that will shape the esports industry.  This Note analyzes 
how the professional sports industry and foreign esports markets have 
addressed governance challenges that arise from differences between 
traditional sports and competitive video gaming.  It concludes by exploring 
two potential pathways for domestic esports governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 21, 2016, the World Championship Semifinals for “League of 
Legends,” the most popular competitive video game, took place over two 
consecutive sold-out nights at Madison Square Garden in New York City.1  
Tension in the stadium was palpable as ten young South Korean players, five 
for each qualifying semifinal team, hunched over computer battle stations, 
rapidly clicking away.  Instead of watching the competition floor, spectators 
looked up at the stadium ceiling where large screens projected various angles 
of the live virtual gameplay.  This is the future of professional competition, 
sport, and video games—a potent combination of entertainment forms that is 
ripe for potential investors. 
Technological advancements have fundamentally penetrated and altered 
the fabric of modern society by creating new avenues for media consumption, 
cross-border communication, and social interaction.2  With the advent of the 
 
 1. See ROX v. SKT, LOL ESPORTS, http://www.lolesports.com/en_US/worlds/ 
world_championship_2016/matches/elimination/R2M1 [https://perma.cc/7A63-GS57] (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 2. See T.L. TAYLOR, RAISING THE STAKES:  ESPORTS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF 
COMPUTER GAMING 18 (2012) (attributing the increase in esports consumption to “important 
structural factors” like favorable government policies, a competitive market structure, swift 
development of information and communication technologies, the transnationalization and 
globalization of the game industry, and individuals’ mentalities about accepting new 
technologies). 
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internet and increasingly speedier connections, online video game players 
benefit from instantaneous interactions.3  Widespread connectivity has 
enabled the rise in popularity of “esports,” a term often used to refer to online 
competitive gaming.4 
An esport is “a form of sport[] where the primary aspects of the sport are 
facilitated by electronic systems; the input of players and teams as well as the 
output of the [esport] system are mediated by human-computer interfaces.”5  
In the esports ecosystem, professional video game players around the world 
make a living by competing in tournaments and leagues for prize pools on 
behalf of team owners and corporate sponsors.6 
Esports games have captured the world’s attention, and an entire 
ecosystem has developed around distributing competitive virtual gameplay.  
If the 213 million global esports consumers formed a nation,7 it would be the 
fifth-largest nation in the world.8  Game developers, tournament teams, 
independent leagues, broadcasting companies, and other market participants 
want to capture a portion of the growing worldwide esports market, which is 
expected to exceed $1 billion by 2019.9  In 2016, the United States generated 
an estimated $175 million in esports revenue from online advertising, 
sponsorships, media rights, merchandise, and ticketing.10  In September 
2016, seven North American esports teams announced the formation of the 
Professional Esports Association (PEA), a “franchise-and-player-focused 
league more in line with the structures of [traditional] sports leagues,”11 
which emulates the early stages of traditional sports governance.  Later that 
same month, a National Basketball Association (NBA) team became the first 
North American professional sports organization to acquire an esports team 
 
 3. ROLAND LI, GOOD LUCK HAVE FUN:  THE RISE OF ESPORTS 1–3 (2016). 
 4. See Katherine E. Hollist, Note, Time to Be Grown-Ups About Video Gaming:  The 
Rising Esports Industry and the Need for Regulation, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 825 (2015). 
 5. Juho Hamari & Max Sjöblom, What Is Esports and Why Do People Watch It? 27 
INTERNET RES. 211, 213–14 (2017). 
 6. See id. (stating that esports are “often coordinated by different leagues, ladders and 
tournaments, and where players customarily belong to teams or other ‘sporting’ organizations 
who are sponsored by various business organizations”); Michael McTee, Note, E-Sports:  
More Than Just a Fad, OKLA. J.L. & TECH., Jan. 2014, at 1. 
 7. See Esports Market Report, SUPERDATA, https://www.superdataresearch.com/market-
data/esports-market-brief/ [https://perma.cc/YU2U-ZBJ7] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 8. See Ben Casselman, Resistance Is Futile:  Esports Is Massive . . . and Growing, ESPN 
(May 22, 2015), http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/13059210/esports-massive-industry-
growing [https://perma.cc/N86X-ZAA7]. 
 9. See Darren Rovell, 427 Million People Will Be Watching Esports by 2019, Reports 
Newzoo, ESPN (May 11, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/article/15508214/427-
million-people-watching-esports-2019-reports-newzoo [https://perma.cc/HZ4X-DS3K]. 
 10. MEC GLOB., SPOTLIGHT ON ESPORTS:  AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROWING ESPORTS 
LANDSCAPE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR MARKETERS 9 (2016), http://www.mecglobal.com/ 
assets/publications/2016-08/Spotlight-On-Esports.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCX3-CSY6]. 
 11. B. David Zarley, The Sporting Singularity:  How Traditional Sports and Esports Are 
Dovetailing, VICE (Nov. 9, 2016), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/mgz7eb/the-sporting-
singularity-how-traditional-sports-and-esports-are-dovetailing [https://perma.cc/FXL9-
87MD]. 
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and,12 in doing so, noted:  “[t]he market created itself and became a product 
that a quarter billion people are watching, and when they watch, they’re 
watching an hour and half a day . . . .  [I]t’s an incredibly large, immature 
market that is somewhat of a Wild West.”13 
Compared to more developed online gaming markets around the globe, the 
American esports market is the new Wild West frontier.14  For the most part, 
the dovetailing between esports and traditional sports,15 and the increasing 
regulatory legitimacy of esports,16 indicates that many of these issues can be 
addressed within the confines of traditional sports governance.17  Private 
investment in esports continues to grow and “[t]hrough a series of purchases, 
investments, and coalitions, traditional sport structures and proclivities 
finally merged irrevocably with esports.”18 
However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that, as the esports industry 
evolves, esports will not perfectly align with the governance structures of 
 
 12. See Darren Rovell, 76ers Acquire Esports Teams Dignitas and Apex, ESPN (Sept. 26, 
2016), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/17637299/76ers-acquire-esports-teams-
dignitas-apex [https://perma.cc/KDN8-24N8].  
 13. See id. 
 14. On September 27, 2016, the coowner of the NBA’s Golden State Warriors announced 
the acquisition of an iconic esports team, Team Liquid, and the creation of a new esports 
ownership group. Rachel Young Gu, Team Liquid Sells Controlling Interest to Golden State 
Warriors Co-Owner, ESPN (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/ 
_/id/17651274/team-liquid-sells-controlling-interest-golden-state-warriors-co-owner 
[https://perma.cc/RH74-LEX8]; see also Axiomatic Acquires Controlling Interest in Team 
Liquid, a Leading Professional Esports Franchise, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 27, 2016, 10:06 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160927006174/en/Axiomatic-Acquires-
Controlling-Interest-Team-Liquid-Leading [https://perma.cc/MH34-UAS6] (listing other 
notable owners such as Magic Johnson and Monumental Sports & Entertainment, the owner 
and operator of the NBA’s Washington Wizards and the National Hockey League’s 
Washington Capitals); Press Release, Madison Square Garden Co., The Madison Square 
Garden Company Acquires Controlling Stake in Counter Logic Gaming (July 31, 2017), 
http://www.themadisonsquaregardencompany.com/news/2017/counter-logic-gaming.html 
[https://perma.cc/R5Z8-MWRQ] (“‘As esports moves toward franchise league models similar 
to the NBA and NHL, we intend to leverage our knowledge and insight into the business of 
professional sports to play an active role in the development of this exciting industry,’ said 
Jordan Solomon, Executive Vice President of [Madison Square Garden] Sports.”). 
 15. For the purposes of this Note, “traditional sports” refers to the “big four” American 
professional sports:  football, baseball, basketball, and hockey. 
 16. For example, in 2013, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services began to 
recognize professional esports players as athletes by issuing P-1 visas to international players. 
See Yannick Lejacq, Score!  Professional Video Gamers Awarded Athletic Visas, NBC NEWS 
(July 19, 2013, 7:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/technology/score-professional-video-
gamers-awarded-athletic-visas-6C10679998 [https://perma.cc/LR64-CFWJ]. 
 17. Professional sports organizations also govern issues including players’ rights, 
collective bargaining and labor union management, salary controls and transparency, 
contractual stability, and antidoping.  Although a comprehensive discussion of players’ rights 
in esports is beyond the scope of this Note, there is a significant body of literature analyzing 
these issues. See, e.g., Thiemo Bräutigam, Riot’s New LCS Player Contracts—A Legal 
Analysis, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2015), http://esportsobserver.com/riots-new-lcs-
player-contracts-a-legal-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/Z97A-T3LR] (analyzing professional 
player contracts in a developer-sponsored league).  
 18. Zarley, supra note 11. 
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traditional sports.19  In esports, just as in other traditional sports, the 
“business is [in] creating stars”20 that will capture the attention of viewers.21  
Yet, if asked to imagine a “sport,” most would likely think of a physical sport 
like basketball, football, baseball, or hockey.  Despite many similarities, there 
exists a tension between the physical world of professional sports and the 
virtual world of professional gaming.  With the recent global rise of esports, 
the scope of what constitutes a “sport” has been widely debated.22  A 
fundamental quandary for esports governance is that competitive play takes 
place online, where physical analogues provide no precedent.23  Esports do 
not benefit from the same level of legislative protection that has helped shape 
the traditional sports industry,24 and, unlike traditional sports, game 
developers hold intellectual property rights.25 
Accordingly, this Note will address the need for either a domestic or 
international regulatory body to support and facilitate the professionalization 
of the U.S. esports industry.  Part I provides a general overview of the market 
structure and commercialization of both traditional sports and esports.  Part 
II focuses upon key areas where existing traditional sports do not provide 
adequate guidance to esports, including ownership, territoriality, and media 
distribution.26  Next, Part III assesses how regulatory bodies of larger esports 
markets have addressed esports issues.  In conclusion, Part IV advocates for 
the adoption of a regulatory body that will facilitate the growth of the 
domestic esports industry.27 
 
 19. See generally Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports:  Proprietary Rights in Professional 
Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535 (2013) (discussing the possibilities and 
ramifications of ownership rights in esports). 
 20. Paresh Dave, Owners of Professional Video Game Teams in a Battle of Their Own, 
L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-
esports-owners-20160526-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/7QF3-CKZW]. 
 21. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 17 (“[T]ales are told about young men who have 
ascended to the level of national hero by playing computer games.  The stories circle around 
the rise of a professional scene whose players have fan bases comparable to that of American 
mainstream sports stars.  They hold contracts and sponsorship deals, wear the latest in sport 
gear from Nike and Adidas, and play in competitions that regularly draw thousands and are 
broadcast on major television channels.”). 
 22. See McTee, supra note 6, at 7 (“A common argument made is ‘if it can be done while 
drinking and smoking, then it is not a sport.’  Such a definition is problematic for defining 
video games as a true form of ‘professional sport’ (as well as golf, track and field, and many 
other highly athletic competitions sometimes regarded as sport).”). 
 23. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 37 (“Computer games can prove elusive artifacts when 
we try to discuss the material world in relation to them because so much of our attention drifts 
to the space on the screen.  The media aspect of computer game play may prompt an argument 
suggesting they cannot be easily aligned with a notion of sport.”). 
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. See Andreas Rahmatian, Cyberspace and Intellectual Property Rights, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 72, 76 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell 
Buchan eds., 2015) (“The international nature of cyberspace with separate (private, property-
holding) individuals and companies as actors within the cyberspace can potentially blur the 
legal division between sovereignty and property. . . .  So he who has quasi-proprietary power 
over the cyberspace may very well acquire quasi-sovereignty over people . . . .”). 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
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I.  THE UNITED STATES OF PLAY:  
UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS OF COMPETITIVE SPORTS 
In many regards, the governance and commercialization of the esports 
industry noticeably emulates the traditional sports industry.28  This Part 
provides an overview and background helpful for understanding the 
emerging esports market.  First, it looks at the joint-venture structure of 
traditional sports organizations and compares this structure to the 
organizations that have materialized in the esports industry.  Then, for both 
the traditional sports and esports markets in the United States, it analyzes 
content distribution as a major force behind commercial viability. 
A.  Current Structural Models 
The esports industry presents a “nascent structure that one team owner has 
compared to the state of American baseball when the first vestigial forms of 
the current team, league, and ownership structures were emerging.”29  A 
primer on traditional sports governance, then, can offer insight into how 
professional sports became a mainstay of the U.S. entertainment industry and 
also provide a potential model for esports governance.  This Part discusses 
the governance structures of traditional sports and esports in the United 
States. 
1.  Traditional Sports 
Traditional team sports are generally structured as a league and consist of 
clubs, teams, or franchises that are distinct, albeit economically 
interdependent, business entities within the league.30  In the United States, 
the highest level of professional competitions in team sports are known as 
“major professional sports leagues” and include the NBA, Major League 
Baseball (MLB), National Football League (NFL), and National Hockey 
League (NHL).31  Each of these leagues enjoys significant control over 
governance issues.32 
Leagues are often structured as joint ventures.33  A joint venture is a 
business undertaking by multiple stakeholders engaged in a single defined 
 
 28. See Zarley, supra note 11. 
 29. Burk, supra note 19, at 1540. 
 30. See generally Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint 
Ventures:  Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and Less Like the United 
Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 222 (2006) (stating that a league is a “product created by 
the combination of upstream competition organizing services and downstream clubs 
participating in the competition”). 
 31. See Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 573, 575 n.1 (2015).   
 32. See RICHARD PARRISH & SAMULI MIETTINEN, THE SPORTING EXCEPTION IN EUROPEAN 
UNION LAW 21 (2008) (“These [governance issues] include reserve clauses, draft rules, roster 
limits, salary caps, collective bargaining arrangements, revenue sharing, joint merchandising 
and the collective sale and reinvestment of broadcasting rights.”). 
 33. See generally Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30 (discussing the joint-venture structure 
of professional sports leagues). 
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project.34  Each stakeholder shares equal control over the venture and also 
shares both profits and losses.35  Joint ventures do not have immunity from 
antitrust laws but may exhibit anticompetitive, cartel-like behavior.36  Within 
a joint-venture league, teams and clubs are franchised to the league, and a 
league-affiliated team cannot compete outside of the league.37 
Professional sports leagues draft rules to coordinate the particulars of 
competition, such as the rules of play, number of teams admitted to the 
league, revenue distribution and sharing, player contracts and trading rules, 
sale of broadcast rights, and stadium facility standards.38  When enforcement 
of organizational rules is vested in an independent entity, such rules serve to 
enable and preserve the integrity of competition.39  Each league typically is 
headed by a commissioner who is empowered to enforce the league rules that 
were collectively agreed upon by member franchises.40 
Leagues are formed as joint ventures due to a “conscious decision to 
vertically integrate,”41 and franchises collectively govern the competition—
like tournament organization—instead of granting such control to a separate 
entity.42  Decisions made by a franchise-run league are subject to voting 
requirements and are thus likely to be suboptimal; franchises are more likely 
to advance individual interests over the interests of the league as a whole.43  
In fact, franchises within a league “will necessarily make decisions . . . that 
limit the extent of economic competition,” which may “simultaneously 
enhance the overall quality of league play (acceptable under antitrust law) 
and simply increase profits (unacceptable under antitrust law).”44 
Moreover, major American professional sports leagues operate in a market 
with few alternatives, and “[s]ports leagues that do not face competition from 
close substitutes will artificially suppress the number of franchises in the 
league.”45  New franchises enjoy permanent membership after authorization 
by the league.46  They are also subject to entry fees, which are then distributed 
among the league’s existing franchises.47  Individual franchises must 
cooperate to maintain competitive balance and often swing toward 
 
 34. Joint Ventures, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
113 (1984) (stating that “joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws”). 
 37. See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 32, at 20–21. 
 38. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 222–23. 
 39. Id. at 222. 
 40. See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 32, at 21. 
 41. Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 223. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. (“In any partnership where profits are shared, the marginal benefit to each 
partner accruing through the sharing arrangement is smaller than the total benefit, and 
therefore no partner has the incentive to vote in ways which maximize total payoffs.”). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 226 (arguing for restructuring and regulation of professional sports to better align 
with consumer demand). 
 46. Franchises are not subjected to competitive merit-based promotion and relegation, 
which could bump a team out of a league. See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 32, at 18. 
 47. See id. at 20–21. 
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monopolistic practices that run up against anticompetition law.48  Thus, a 
significant risk of joint-venture operation without vigorous marketplace 
rivalry is that the franchises, acting in their own self-interest, will prevent the 
venture from providing innovative goods and services in response to 
consumer demand.49 
2.  Esports 
Compared to the traditional sports industry, the esports industry is 
comprised of more stakeholders:  the game developers, the league or 
tournament organizational bodies, the teams that contract to play within the 
organizational body, the professional players that contract to play on teams, 
the sponsors, and, often, a streaming site as the content distributor.50  Both 
tournaments and leagues form the backbone of the esports industry,51 and 
each organizational body licenses the right to play titles created by game 
developers.52  Esport competitions run the gamut of styles, but the most 
popular games center around team-based play.53  High-profile tournaments 
typically occur in front of a live audience, while other fans live stream the 
games on social media and video platforms like Twitch.tv or Justin.tv.54 
Instead of adopting the joint-venture structure of professional sports,55 
game developers have taken up the mantle of privately sponsoring leagues.  
 
 48. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 223; see also PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra 
note 32, at 20–21 (“[O]ff-the-field competition between teams operating within the same 
league is moderated by a high degree of co-ordination in their activities. . . .  Consequently, 
throughout the US leagues a range of solidarity and restraint mechanisms are in place to ensure 
balanced on-the-field competition.”). 
 49. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 215. 
 50. See Hunter Amadeus Bayliss, Note, Not Just a Game:  The Employment Status and 
Collective Bargaining Rights of Professional Esports Players, 22 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. 
JUST. 359, 363–64 (2016) (“Professional League of Legends play involves six main actors:  
sponsors, Riot Games, the League of Legends Championship Series (LCS), the team 
organizations, the professional players, and streaming sites.”). 
 51. Symposium, Sports, Media & Millennials:  Evolving Landscape of Consumer 
Demand, 24 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 143, 194 (2017) (“[Esport structuring], 
organically, has followed two models.  There’s the tournament model and then there’s the 
league model, right?  So there’s golf and tennis.  There are no guaranteed salaries in golf and 
tennis; the top ten players make most of the money.  It’s all prize money and endorsement 
deals.  That’s very similar to what’s happening in a lot of [esports] games because they grew 
up organically.”). 
 52. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 160.  However, esports leagues and tournaments still 
struggle to generate profits. See Hollist, supra note 4, at 828 (“Traditionally, the costs of 
operating esports leagues have far out-paced profits, making it all but impossible for leagues 
to launch.”); Pete Volk, Riot:  Esports Still Isn’t Profitable, and We Don’t Care, RIFT HERALD 
(Sept. 13, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.riftherald.com/2016/9/13/12865772/lol-esports-profit-
money-riot [https://perma.cc/5DV7-AXQK] (“One of the hottest issues around competitive 
League of Legends is the profitability, or lack thereof, of Riot’s esports wing.”). 
 53. See Burk, supra note 19, at 1538 (“[Esports] tournaments employ a variety of 
commercial game titles; tournament games span a range of formats and organizational 
conventions, including both single and team play.”). 
 54. See id. at 1541. 
 55. See infra Part II.  
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Yet, game developers “still see themselves first and foremost as a game 
producer—not sports provider.”56 
For example, Blizzard Entertainment and Riot Games, two game 
developers based in the United States, have forged the path for the esports 
industry by producing commercial games that have captured a global 
audience.57  Some game developers, like Blizzard Entertainment, have 
expressed a hands-off approach58 and do not want a primary role in the 
development of future leagues or in shaping the esports industry.59  Other 
game developers, such as Riot Games, however, have extended control over 
the competition structure and governance of their games. 
League of Legends, a game developed by Riot Games for the personal 
computer, has arguably been the most popular esports title in the world in 
recent years.60  The dominance of League of Legends can be attributed, at 
least in part, to the fact that Riot Games assumes all of the costs of organizing 
competition.61  League of Legends has its own developer-sponsored league 
with seasons, brackets, an annual championship and all-star tournament, and 
even a fantasy league for fans.62  Esports developers like Riot Games 
frequently engage in political and symbolic work on behalf of the industry as 
 
 56. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 166. 
 57. See MARK J.P. WOLF & TORU IWATANI, VIDEO GAMES AROUND THE WORLD 605–06 
(2015). 
 58. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 163 (“We’re not in the business of [esports].  You know, 
we make games, we make video games.  We see [esports] as an extension of our community 
because this is a group of people in our community that not only enjoy playing our games 
competitively, but also enjoy following these games and the players that play them 
competitively.”). 
 59. See id. at 165 (“[W]e want [esports] to succeed, but again, it’s not our core business 
so to become involved in that regard it’s almost like you’re talking about creating its own 
organization, like a FIFA or something like that, to oversee the sport. . . .  [I]t’s just a different 
environment than traditional sports.”). 
 60. See NewZoo, Most Watched Games on Twitch, NEWZOO, https://newzoo.com/ 
insights/rankings/top-games-twitch/ [https://perma.cc/8PKN-NT3Y] (last visited Oct. 16, 
2017).  League of Legends is a type of video game known as a Multiplayer Online Battle 
Arena (MOBA) game, which is a team-based game that operates like a combination of capture 
the flag and chess. Hollist, supra note 4, at 826.  Two teams of five select from a growing list 
of avatars and attempt to control the playing field. See Champions, LEAGUE LEGENDS, 
http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-info/champions/ [https://perma.cc/53B5-
3QZ5] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).  Players must defeat computer-controlled minions as well 
as opponent players in order to advance and eventually destroy the other team’s home base. 
See Taylor Cocke, How to Play League of Legends, the Biggest Game in the World, KOTAKU 
(Oct. 31, 2013), http://kotaku.com/how-to-get-into-league-of-legends-the-biggest-game-in-
1456272237 [https://perma.cc/3KY4-BFSL]. 
 61. David Segal, Behind League of Legends, E-Sports’s Main Attraction, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/technology/riot-games-league-of-
legends-main-attraction-esports.html [https://perma.cc/HK4X-CSCH] (“Though [esports] 
were around for about a decade before Riot Games was born, no company has jumped in with 
the same intensity.  Riot controls every aspect of the professional league, right down to the 
music composed for live events.”).  
 62. Afrasiab Mian, Can Activision-Blizzard (ATVI) Profit from Esports Leagues?, 
NASDAQ (June 29, 2016), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/can-activision-blizzard-atvi-profit-
from-esports-leagues-cm642968 [https://perma.cc/3ZYK-CBHK]. 
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a whole,63 but some facets of esports writ large—such as proposing 
professionalization standards and advocating for national legislation—lie 
outside the purview and efforts of any single developer. 
B.  Making “Cents” of Sports Business Revenue 
Though the fledgling esports industry is dovetailing with traditional 
sports,64 it does not benefit from the same level of federal government 
protection granted to traditional sports leagues.  This Part gives background 
on how traditional sports and esports leagues derive revenue. 
1.  Traditional Sports 
The traditional sports industry is built around monetizing competition and 
would not exist without collusion.65  Franchises within a league collude to 
manage competition and maximize profits by enacting rules that govern 
player contracts and trades, territorial rights, and content distribution.66  The 
professional sports leagues “provide teams with sufficient individual 
economic incentive to ensure that they will maximize the profits available in 
their local market, thus increasing the entire league’s revenues.”67  In doing 
so, they effectively operate as natural monopolies.68  Lawmakers have 
enacted legislation that authorizes collusive television-rights bargaining 
practices, and federal courts have issued league-favorable opinions.69 
 
 63. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 174–75 (“[Esports] companies regularly work hard to try 
and legitimize (and indeed unstigmatize) computer game play, and the hard-core fandom you 
see in esports.”).  
 64. See generally Jon Robinson, ‘League of Legends’ Mimics Regular Sports, ESPN (Jan. 
30, 2013), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/tech/post/_/id/3979/league-of-legends-mimics-
regular-sports [https://perma.cc/F2R2-WKLV] (exploring Riot Games’s promotion of esports 
as a viable real sport and occupation). 
 65. See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg & Justin M. Lovich, Reverse Collusion, 4 HARV. J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. 191 (2013) (discussing how professional sports’ collective-bargaining 
agreements tend toward collusive practices). 
 66. See Mohamed El-Hodiri & James Quirk, An Economic Model of a Professional Sports 
League, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1302, 1304 (1971). 
 67. See Grow, supra note 31, at 588 (“[P]rofessional sports leagues have designed an 
elaborate framework to balance their need to encourage teams to compete vigorously on the 
playing field, while at the same time ensuring that a sufficient level of competitive balance 
exists within the sport to create the most marketable and commercially successful product 
possible.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, Sports and the City:  How to Curb Professional Sports 
Teams’ Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 48–49 (2008) 
(“However, in practice, the four premier sports leagues rarely face competition from any new 
league because sports markets have high barriers to entry.”); Grow, supra note 31, at 574 
(stating that “direct government regulation of the [professional] industry is warranted” in such 
cases). 
 69. See infra Part I.B.1.b. 
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a.  Pooled Broadcast Rights 
Professional sports leagues have relied on television broadcasting as the 
predominant means of revenue generation and content distribution.70  The 
NBA, NHL, and MLB exclusively sell their national television rights on a 
league-wide basis and, in some instances, permit individual franchises to 
license broadcast rights regionally.71 
The sale of broadcast rights, however, often involves transaction costs and 
significant externalities because franchises “do not operate in completely 
independent broadcast markets.”72  Broadcast revenue is contingent on the 
league’s overall appeal, and competition can be distorted by the number of 
consumers in local media markets.73  Thus, to ease the sale of broadcast rights 
for traditional sports leagues, American lawmakers enacted the Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961,74 which states: 
The antitrust laws, as defined in [section one of the Sherman Act,] . . . shall 
not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or 
conducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball, 
basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating in 
professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or 
otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member 
clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games . . . by such clubs.75 
This statute provides an antitrust exemption to league teams when they enter 
anticompetitive “pooled-rights contracts.”76  As a result, the Sports 
Broadcasting Act allows traditional sports leagues to pool the broadcasting 
rights of individual franchises and then sell those rights as a package to over-
the-air networks.77 
 
 70. See, e.g., Grow, supra note 31, at 616; Michelle R. Hull, Note, Sports Leagues’ New 
Social Media Policies:  Enforcement Under Copyright Law and State Law, 34 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 457, 464 (2011) (reporting that the NFL earns over two-thirds of its revenue from 
television, while the MLB and the NBA each receive over one-half of their income from 
television deals). 
 71. See Grow, supra note 31, at 616.  Even so, despite a trial court finding no evidence of 
substantial injury to the value of outside broadcast rights, the NBA sought to prevent a 
franchised team from broadcasting its games on a regional channel in a move to maintain 
broadcast market power. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 229 (discussing the NBA’s 
legal fight against the Chicago Bulls). 
 72. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30, at 229.  
 73. See id. at 229–30. 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 75. Id. (emphasis added). 
 76. See U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1347 (2d Cir. 
1988) (“Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which exempted from the 
antitrust laws pooled-rights agreements entered into by professional sports leagues.”). 
 77. This practice is known as “sponsored telecasting.”  While this exemption only covers 
over-the-air networks, the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice have 
accepted that traditional sports leagues’ cable broadcast agreements with networks like ESPN 
also do not warrant antitrust agency action. See Grow, supra note 31, at 620–21. 
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b.  Regional Monopolies 
Furthermore, traditional sports leagues are built on local communities’ 
support for competitive regional teams.78  Franchises in a professional sports 
league have exclusive territorial rights that cover major metropolitan areas,79 
thus eliminating the possibility of a local rival.80  Despite such 
anticompetitive practices, courts have ruled favorably for professional sports 
leagues, and “[v]irtually nothing the leagues do can be considered per se 
anticompetitive.”81 
In 1982, a potential NFL franchisee, the Grizzlies, brought an antitrust suit 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the NFL and argued that the 
collective refusal to accept the Grizzlies’ membership into the league 
unlawfully impeded trade.82  The court ruled in favor of the NFL and held 
that “a professional sport league’s refusal to accept for membership a 
qualified applicant for a franchise in an area where no current league team is 
located” does not violate antitrust laws.83 
Such federal support of regional lockouts bolsters a professional sports 
league’s profitability.84  Localities are willing to compete in recruitment and 
retention of traditional sports players due to the reputational and economic 
benefits associated with professional sports.85  Professional sports teams 
have been able to obtain massive subsidies from their host communities and 
 
 78. Burk, supra note 19, at 1578 (“The culture, practice, and business of traditional sports 
are built around the features of physical location; physical sports teams rely on the geographic 
loyalty of spectators that identify with a locally branded team; locations for stadiums and 
receipts from spectator attendance constitute important sources of revenue; construction of 
such venues is typically dependent on tax and subsidy benefits from local communities.”). 
 79. See generally Rupert Cornwell, The U.S. Franchise System . . . Coming to a League 
Near You?, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-
and-comment/the-us-franchise-systemcoming-to-a-league-near-you-2374155.html 
[https://perma.cc/H9JL-A2Z8]. 
 80. See Edelman, supra note 68, at 49 (“[S]ome liken a sports league’s tight control on its 
number of franchises to a form of blackmail or extortion.”). 
 81. Leah Farzin, On the Antitrust Exemption for Professional Sports in the United States 
and Europe, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 75, 107 (2015) (“Automatic rule of reason 
scrutiny for sports antitrust cases in the [United States] means leagues are always afforded the 
opportunity to justify their anticompetitive actions based on the nature of their industry.”); see 
also El-Hodiri & Quirk, supra note 66, at 1304 (stating that, with respect to collective 
agreements such as “rules governing television and radio contracts” and “rules governing 
territorial rights,” professional sports leagues have garnered legislative support). 
 82. Mid-S. Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 
720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 83. Id. at 560. 
 84. See Edelman, supra note 68, at 50 (“Absent the monopoly power of America’s 
professional sports leagues, few communities would likely subsidize the professional sports 
industry.”). 
 85. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional 
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 913 (1999) (“Local governments are willing to invest substantial 
sums to attract teams, as they are desperate to obtain the status of a ‘major league city.’”). 
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local governments,86 typically in the form of new stadiums constructed at the 
expense of the public.87 
2.  Esports 
Video games are the products of a sophisticated development process that 
combines elements of the creative industry—such as world building, 
illustration, and interface design—with advanced software technology.88  
Copyright law grants game developers intellectual property rights over the 
creative aspects embodied within a game.89  The copyright holder enjoys the 
exclusive right to make copies, distribute, make derivative works, and 
publicly display the game.90  Thus, “[c]opyright is likely to be the lynchpin 
in any dispute.”91 
Esports industry participants—game developers as the “creators and 
owners of copyright works,”92 players and teams, and content distributors—
all seek to direct revenue-generating activities.  But, when key drivers of 
esports revenue—such as “advertising, sponsorship, merchandise, live event 
revenues, and potentially publisher partnerships”93—hinge on copyright 
ownership, then the game developer as the copyright holder often directs how 
a game makes money.  While teams in traditional sports leagues share control 
over a league’s actions,94 esports teams are subject to the control of the game 
developer.95 
Accordingly, sale of competition is often governed by the private game 
developer through licensing agreements for tournaments and leagues.96  
Licenses “can range from [competition organizers] having formal agreements 
 
 86. See Gregg Easterbrook, How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-
taxpayers/309448/ [https://perma.cc/RS7B-Q7KH] (estimating that “[a]nnualized, NFL 
stadium subsidies and tax favors add up to perhaps $1 billion”). 
 87. See Edelman, supra note 68, at 42 (“Since the 1970s, most local communities have 
paid between seventy percent and eighty percent of new stadium building costs.”). 
 88. See generally WOLF & IWATANI, supra note 57, at 4 (explaining how video games 
benefit from the verbal and visual literacy of the film and television industries). 
 89. See John M. Neclerio & Matthew C. Mousley, Copyright Law Implications in Video 
Games and Virtual Worlds, in COMPUTER GAMES AND VIRTUAL WORLDS:  A NEW FRONTIER IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 47, 47 (Ross A. Dannenberg et al. eds., 2010) (“Generally, 
copyright in virtual world content initially vests in virtual world developers and creators.”).  
Copyright protection for video game production and development is largely settled, but 
property rights within video games remain a contentious issue. See id. at 62 (“Because U.S. 
courts have not yet squarely addressed this issue, users and developers of virtual worlds will 
have to wait for future judicial opinions to know with any certainty the extent of copyright 
protection for their in-world creations and activity.”). 
 90. Id. at 49. 
 91. Burk, supra note 19, at 1569. 
 92. Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Evolution and Equilibrium:  An Introduction, in THE 
EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 3 (Susy Frankel & Daniel 
Gervais eds., 2014). 
 93. Jas Purewal & Isabel Davies, The Esports Explosion:  Legal Challenges and 
Opportunities, LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2016, at 24, 27. 
 94. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 95. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 96. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 159–60. 
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with game companies to use their games in an ongoing tournament series 
(and broadcast) all the way to ad hoc one-time agreements between an 
organizer and game company.”97  Unlike in traditional sports, game 
developers play a role in shaping the exposure and popularity of teams within 
a league or tournament.98  Through license agreements, game developers 
maximize profits by selectively authorizing players and content distributors 
to exercise the developer’s exclusive rights under copyright in exchange for 
royalties or fees.99  The general trend is for game developers to subcontract 
out the work of organizing leagues and tournaments to regional affiliates, 
thereby granting content-distribution rights for some form of financial 
kickback.100 
Furthermore, whereas traditional sports leagues derive a majority of their 
income from collective television broadcast agreements,101 broadcast 
television is not the primary source of revenue for esports.102  While esports 
commercialization also depends on content distribution as a primary source 
of revenue,103 the esports industry lacks the regulatory support afforded to 
traditional sports in broadcast television.104   
Esports matches are televised over broadcast, cable, or pay-per-view 
channels, but most tournament audiences “attend” over internet platforms.105  
Online platforms facilitate accessibility and extensive infiltration into any 
market, which,106 in turn, empowers game developers to create new games 
for player-versus-player competition.107  Instead of television, esports 
consumers watch matches through video-streaming websites,108 such as 
 
 97. See id.  
 98. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 99. Cf. Neclerio & Mousley, supra note 89, at 82–83. 
 100. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 160. 
 101. See Hull, supra note 70, at 464. 
 102. See Purewal & Davies, supra note 93, at 27 (“In principle, broadcast revenues could 
be a significant revenue driver (as in traditional sports), but historically there has been no 
meaningful ‘traditional broadcast’ (i.e., to TV) of [esports] until this year, all broadcast to date 
being effectively via digital platforms such as Twitch where it generally has been viewable for 
free by default.”); Symposium, supra note 51, at 185 (“If you look at traditional sports, a lot 
of these teams are going to be making roughly 70% or so of their revenues off of broadcasting 
rights.  But when you look at esports, actually, that number is closer to zero.”). 
 103. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 105. See Burk, supra note 19, at 1540–41. 
 106. For example, the extensive penetration of esports in South Korea is likely related to 
South Korea’s eleven billion dollar network infrastructure overhaul—resulting in the fastest 
internet connection on the planet. See LI, supra note 3, at 29. 
 107. See id. at 2 (“Many of the best games allow players to clearly differentiate themselves 
through skill, falling somewhere between the curated, individualized experience of traditional 
art and the competitive nature of sports.”). 
 108. Cf. Symposium, supra note 51, at 182–83 (“[W]hat’s happening in the whole media 
industry now is unique in that there are cord-cutters; people are ditching their cable 
subscriptions.  And basically millennials and Gen Zs are cord nevers; they’re not even 
watching television.”). 
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Twitch.tv, where peak viewership can surpass primetime traffic of major 
cable channels.109 
II.  DOVETAILING OR DIVERGING?:  
COMPARING ESPORTS TO TRADITIONAL SPORTS 
Due to the favorable legal treatment of traditional sports,110 the debate over 
whether esports is a “sport” remains contentious.111  Certain aspects of 
esports are analogous to traditional sports and the involvement of traditional 
sports market participants in esports “may expedite the learning curve for 
their digital brethren.”112  These similarities encourage a discussion 
regarding which aspects of professional-sports governance are easily 
incorporated into esports regulation. 
Yet, comparison is only productive to the extent that esports parallels 
traditional sports.  Despite many similarities, esports reside in the digital 
space, and such a difference renders analogous reform improbable.113  Part 
II highlights the differences between esports and traditional sports such as:  
(1) reliability of gameplay rules, (2) lack of regional ties, (3) preference for 
online streaming over broadcast television, and (4) anticompetitive behavior. 
A.  Variable Rules of Gameplay 
Video games are bits of user interaction “mediated by the software and 
video apparatus of the game,”114 which complicates ownership of both game 
 
 109. See Michael Larkey, Note, Cooperative Play:  Anticipating the Problem of Copyright 
Infringement in the New Business of Live Video Game Webcasts, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 52, 53 (2015) (“Peak viewership on Twitch can surpass primetime viewership of cable 
channels like MTV, MSNBC, E!, and CNN.”); see also PAUL “REDEYE” CHALONER, TALKING 
ESPORTS:  A GUIDE TO BECOMING A WORLD-CLASS ESPORTS BROADCASTER 12 (2015) 
(“Twitch may well be one of the top three biggest things to happen to esports in its short life 
span.”); Symposium, supra note 51, at 190 (“One of the reasons that I feel that esports has 
taken off so quickly and become this kind of giant, global audience is because the traditional 
sports deals are locked into traditional television for many, many more years.”). 
 110. See John T. Holden et al., The Future Is Now:  Esports Policy Considerations and 
Potential Litigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 46, 48 (2017) (“The question of whether 
esports are a sport is legally meaningful.  The United States has a variety of statutes that are 
only applicable to occurrences involving sport.”). 
 111. See, e.g., LI, supra note 3, at 4 (“Veterans of [esports] say it’s ultimately irrelevant if 
competitive gaming is characterized as a sport.  It has all the elements of competition:  high-
stakes winnings, a barrier to competition that takes skill and training, the excitement of fans, 
and now, the technological infrastructure to back it all up.”); TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 36 
(“Well before computer games entered the scene, enthusiasts, regulatory bodies, and athletes 
debated the merits of counting everything from equestrianism to snowboarding as a sport. . . .  
It is in this context that computer gaming now finds itself sitting, often uneasily, between 
digital play and sport.”). 
 112. Zarley, supra note 11. 
 113. But see id. (“There seems to be a conscious effort on the part of the analog sports 
partners, not to fuck with the chemistry that has already proved so successful but rather to find 
ways to work within and expand upon an already popular pastime.  This is about augmenting, 
not overhauling.”). 
 114. Burk, supra note 19, at 1553 (“Certainly the video game players can be observed 
directly, but it is not clear that their physical activity maps onto the role played by physical 
action in physical play; generally keyboard strokes and mouse movement are not what one 
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and gameplay.  Unlike traditional sports, esports’ video games are essentially 
bits of code and computer software subject to various claims of copyright 
ownership.115 
Esports governance is complicated by the fact that game developers create 
and hard code the rules of play into the game,116 and a game developer’s 
interests and claims of ownership under copyright may be misaligned with 
the interests of consumers, players, and team owners.117  Successful esports 
games are susceptible to software updates that adjust and shape mechanics 
that affect gameplay, which means that no dominant strategy stays on top for 
too long.118  This collection of strategies and preferences that shape 
competitive gameplay, the “metagame,” is constantly evolving and defined 
by each individual game developer’s software updates.119 
Esports tournaments and leagues may also impose a separate set of rules 
or guidelines beyond what is embedded by developers into the actual 
game.120  These additional rules are supplementary to the formalized rules of 
play that are programmed into the game and often embody informal norms 
of sportsmanship or fair play.121  Lastly, to add to the morass, “[t]he 
popularity of [esports] games fluctuates over time, and there is no guarantee 
the top games of today will remain in place in two, five, or [ten] years.”122 
B.  Lack of Regional Ties 
Traditional sports teams typically obtain large subsidies from their host 
communities and local governments,123 and leagues incentivize franchised 
 
considers computer ‘gameplay.’  Neither is the unobserved alteration of voltages the players 
prompt across various circuits a matter of much interest.  Rather, it is the video output they 
prompt from the machine that constitutes the activity of interest.”). 
 115. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.  For a thoughtful discussion on 
copyright ownership and claims of neighboring rights in esports, see Burk, supra note 19. 
 116. See, e.g., ERNEST ADAMS, FUNDAMENTALS OF GAME DESIGN 13 (2010) (“Unlike 
conventional games, video games do not require written rules.  The game still has rules, but 
the machine implements and enforces them for the players. . . .  It adjudicates victory and 
defeat if those concepts are programmed into the game.”); TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 49 
(“Computer games . . . encod[e] their logics in the very structure of the game’s software, and 
perhaps in its hardware.”). 
 117. Cf. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 92, at 3 (“We often hear that copyright needs to 
achieve a balance of interests. . . .  [I]t is about balancing multiple competing interests from 
multiple players and recognizing that equilibrium in copyright is complex and dynamic, not 
static.”). 
 118. See LI, supra note 3, at 3. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Burk, supra note 19, at 1563 (“[T]hese [additional rules] run the gamut from 
specifications on hardware and equipment, to prohibitions on certain moves in the game, to 
governance of ‘glitches’ or anomalies in the game software that players might otherwise 
exploit during the course of the contest.”). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Purewal & Davies, supra note 93, at 26. 
 123. See Piraino, supra note 85, at 913 (“Local governments are willing to invest 
substantial sums to attract teams, as they are desperate to obtain the status of a ‘major league 
city.’”). 
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teams to maximize profits in local markets.124  The league structure of 
traditional sports capitalizes on this regionalism.125 
In contrast, esports is a complex mix of regional and global participants.126  
The esports industry is international in nature and “stable teams regularly 
draw their players from a range of countries who generally do not have any 
physical connection with a national home office but instead mediate their 
engagement with the team online, at tournament venues, and in occasional 
co-located boot camps.”127  Increasingly, large esports tournaments are 
“distinctively international in orientation.”128 
Moreover, unlike traditional sports, the U.S. esports industry is fractured 
across many different organizations and competitive games and lacks a 
governing body to set standards of professionalism and maintain rules of 
play.129  Due to this lack of regional affinity, esports-tournaments, 
organizations, and leagues have begun to license their brands,130 thus lending 
name recognition while deferring to local organizers that are better equipped 
with regional knowledge.131  Traditional sports governance fails to 
accommodate and account for the “dual global-local status” of competitive 
gaming.132 
C.  Online over Broadcast 
If traditional sports leagues derive income from television-broadcast 
agreements,133 then why do esports leagues veer away from the contract 
model used by professional sports leagues?134  Due to relative antitrust 
immunity, traditional sports teams have occupied national sports broadcast 
rights,135 and new sports entertainment entrants face high barriers to entry.136  
 
 124. See supra notes 68–80 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Grow, supra note 31, at 588 (“[P]rofessional sports leagues have designed an 
elaborate framework to balance their need to encourage teams to compete vigorously on the 
playing field, while at the same time ensuring that a sufficient level of competitive balance 
exists within the sport to create the most marketable and commercially successful product 
possible.”). 
 126. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 179. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See MEC GLOB., supra note 10, at 9; see also Zarley, supra note 11 (“Perhaps the most 
daunting barrier to entry for aspiring esports fans—and undue burden on the players—is the 
sundry competitions, a dazzling array of ersatz contests and leagues going off, overlapping, 
and winking out like fireworks displays, owned and operated by independent third-party 
organizers lacking in the rigid structure imposed upon traditional sports.”). 
 130. Esports sponsorships have become increasingly intertwined with NBA investors with 
regional knowledge. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also Jacob Wolf, Miami 
Heat Invest in Esports with Misfits, ESPN (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/ 
story/_/id/18444193/miami-heat-invest-esports-misfits [https://perma.cc/X2QB-K7KR]. 
 131. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 179–80. 
 132. Id. at 180. 
 133. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 134. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 144–45; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
 135. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 136. See Grow, supra note 31, at 602 (“Thus, any new entrant in the professional sports 
industry will likely find itself facing a catch-22, unable to generate substantial television 
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By enacting the Sports Broadcasting Act and enabling pooled-rights 
agreements,137 the federal government granted professional sports leagues 
the ability to maintain competitive balance between interdependent teams 
and helped traditional sports leagues remain viable.138  Collective 
broadcasting agreements helped cement the commercial dominance of the 
traditional sports business, but such agreements raise concerns over price-
fixing and restriction of consumer choice.139 
Instead, the majority of esports consumption occurs online via the 
internet.140  Competitions have attracted the attention of several mainstream 
media outlets, like ESPN and Yahoo!,141 that have launched dedicated online 
portals and websites for esports news.  An esports industry thought leader has 
stated:  “Traditional media is important to make [esports] more mainstream 
and to expand the audience.  But I think the old [esports] dream [of] ‘we need 
to get [esports] on TV to succeed’ is dead.  [Esports games] have a proven 
record to be successful on internet stream[s] only.”142 
Given the popularity of online streaming of esports, esports leagues often 
do not prioritize television coverage and choose instead to focus on streaming 
platforms like Twitch.tv.143  The sale of online-streaming rights can be quite 
lucrative.144  For example, on December 16, 2016, an MLB- and Disney-
owned video-streaming company, BAMTech, signed a deal with Riot Games 
to “pay a minimum of $300 million through 2023.”145  In exchange, 
 
revenue until it signs a sufficient pool of talent but lacking the financial means to sign elite 
players without a significant television contract.”). 
 137. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 139. See generally Ross & Szymanski, supra note 30. 
 140. See Symposium, supra note 51, at 197 (“You take a look at the NFL, and they’ve 
grown as far as they can grow, so now they’re looking at London and now they’re looking at 
Mexico and they want to go international.  The NBA, the same way; Major League Baseball, 
the same way.  Well, again, almost like those are TV first, digital second, and esports is digital 
first, TV second, or maybe even TV third, who knows—this is international first.”); see also 
id. at 192 (“[Esports] breaks a lot of models, especially the broadcast model, and we have this 
underlying IP ownership issue that’s different than football and basketball and baseball or any 
stick-and-ball sport.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Paresh Dave, ESPN.com to Cover E-Sports with Same ‘Rigor’ as It Does the 
Big Leagues, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-
tn-espn-esports-20160113-story.html [https://perma.cc/8AKE-WCBJ]; Yahoo Launches New 
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http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160301007090/en/Yahoo-Launches-New-
Experience-Dedicated-Esports [https://perma.cc/JC4T-3BE9]. 
 142. Radoslav “Nydra” Kolev, DreamHack Partners with MTG for Esports Studio in 
Stockholm, GOSU GAMERS (Sept. 25, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.gosugamers.net/starcraft2/ 
news/25446-dreamhack-partners-with-mtg-for-esports-studio-in-stockholm 
[https://perma.cc/2HVV-TAG7]. 
 143. See Larkey, supra note 109, at 53. 
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ENGADGET (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/12/16/bamtech-riot-games-
league-of-legends-streaming-deal-wsj/ [https://perma.cc/LJ49-8KQB]. 
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BAMTech will receive the exclusive right to “stream and monetize” the 
competition play of Riot Games’s League of Legends esports title.146  
However, esports tournaments are structured so that the organizers retain the 
majority of sponsorship and broadcast revenue,147 with some exceptions.148  
This often results in imbalanced profit sharing between the league, the teams, 
and the remaining esports market participants.149 
D.  Anticompetitive Practices 
Traditional sports leagues are formed and maintained as joint ventures.150  
Conversely, the most successful esports leagues are developer sponsored.151  
Both joint-venture leagues and developer-sponsored leagues tend toward 
monopolistic practices that could trigger antitrust scrutiny.152 
A game developer that doubles as a league owner has complete control 
over the players.153  For example, in 2013, Riot Games amended its contract 
terms with a noncompete clause that prevented professional League of 
Legends players from participating in other leagues and from streaming their 
gameplay in any competing video games.154  With one amendment, Riot 
Games unilaterally reduced the rights and earned income of professional 
League of Legends players.155  Riot Games subsequently amended these 
terms after the leaked restrictive contracts produced significant public 
outcry.156 
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 147. See Zarley, supra note 11. 
 148. See, e.g., Imad Khan, Riot Releases Details on NA LCS Franchising with $10M Flat-
Fee Buy-In, ESPN (June 1, 2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/19511222/riot-
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 150. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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Competing Games, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:13 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/ 
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 155. See Hollist, supra note 4, at 829–30 (“In addition to their league salaries, prize 
winnings, and sponsorships, many professional players make money by ‘livestreaming’ . . . 
their video game matches in real-time over websites such as Twitch.tv. . . .  With professional 
player salaries estimated at around $25,000 annually, these streaming revenues amount to a 
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 156. Player Contracts and Unions in the LCS, DPG LAW (Dec. 2013), 
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[https://perma.cc/R6RC-4K5Z] (“[Riot’s director of esports] justified his company’s 
requirements in part by saying that Riot wants League of Legends to be a legitimate sport with 
a professional setting.  Just as you wouldn’t see an NFL player promoting the Arena Football 
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Furthermore, as both the league organizer and the game developer, Riot 
Games can ban a player from participation in a league and even from the 
game entirely.157  Esports players and teams may not have the right to appeal 
these private developer-sponsored league rulings.158  In comparison, 
traditional sports leagues—like the NBA—may ban or suspend a player from 
playing in the league,159 but the player will not be barred from playing the 
sport of basketball entirely. 
Through copyright ownership, a game developer can also control the 
expansion of a developer-sponsored league and prioritize developer interests 
over public uses.160  For example, in July 2017, Riot Games revealed a new 
franchising model for its developer-sponsored league in North America, but 
it did not extend the same franchising model for European teams.161  In its 
own best interest, Riot Games unilaterally restricted the rights of European 
players but also affected the profitability of European teams.162  Unlike a 
joint-venture league, which represents interests beyond the developer’s 
own,163 a developer-sponsored league is focused on the exclusive promotion 
of the developer’s game.164 
III.  SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN GOVERNANCE GLOBALLY 
In August 2017, the International Olympic Committee stated an interest in 
including esports in the 2024 Paris Olympic program but did not commit to 
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 163. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
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doing so.165  The International Olympic Committee attributed its hesitancy 
to the lack of an international governing body ensuring standardization and 
legitimacy.166  Far from achieving even national legitimacy, esports-market 
participants in the United States have thus far been allowed to self-govern.167 
Other countries, however, have begun to recognize the need for oversight 
and have taken affirmative steps to address regulatory gaps to varying 
degrees of success.  South Korea, for example, has developed an extensive 
regulatory environment around esports.168  As recently as September 2016, 
the French Senate legalized “video game competitions” and also 
implemented regulations on exploitative entry fees, thus ensuring the 
payment of cash prizes and minimum standards for professional player 
contracts, visa issues,169 and even the rights of minors under the age of 
sixteen.170  In June 2016, the Russia Ministry of Sport recognized esports as 
a sporting discipline.171  This Part explores the successes and failures of 
esports governance in South Korea and the United Kingdom. 
A.  South Korea 
The current high-water mark for national regulation of the esports market 
can be found in South Korea, where government infrastructure has been 
developed to support the esports industry and where esport games have 
achieved a degree of household recognition and normalcy.172  South Korea 
highlights how cultural influences, larger infrastructure developments, 
government policy decisions, and economic activities have intersected in a 
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WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2017/08/08/paris-mulling-inclusion-of-esports-in-2024-olympic-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/UCH3-XKUC].   
 166. Id. (“We do not see an organization or a structure that will give us confidence, or 
guarantee, that in this area the Olympic rules and values of sport are respected and in place, 
and that the implementation of these rules are monitored and secured.”).  To become an 
Olympic event, a sport must demonstrate a certain level of international organization, 
including having a world governing body like the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) for soccer. See id. 
 167. See Symposium, supra note 51, at 188 (“In terms of the regulatory environment 
generally, the video game industry has done an excellent job for thirty-plus years of being self-
regulated and working directly with state, local, and federal governments around the world to 
be able to maintain a level of sophistication.”); Josh Bray, Esports Is Getting Big, and Here’s 
the Scandals to Prove It, SUPER NERDLAND (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://supernerdland.com/article/esports-getting-big-heres-scandals-prove/ 
[https://perma.cc/3SWX-Y56N] (“[I]f the industry isn’t quick to regulate itself, then they are 
begging for State and Federal authorities in the United States to come and regulate for them.”). 
 168. See infra Part III.A.  
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fortuitous way to support the formation of a flourishing domestic esports 
industry.173 
In 2000, the Korea eSports Association (“KeSPA”) was established as a 
nongovernmental organization after approval and support from South 
Korea’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and it has long been involved in 
regulating national gaming and esports.174  The twelve-member board is 
composed of executives from major corporations and the organization seeks 
to promote “game culture” and support “game-related international 
interaction business.”175  KeSPA, with the support of the South Korean 
government, can officiate and organize tournaments,176 manage esports 
venues and create dedicated esports stadiums,177 oversee the registration of 
South Korean players,178 enforce professionalism and ethical standards,179 
regulate sponsorships,180 distribute competition broadcast rights,181 and 
coordinate licensing agreements.182 
Due to copyright ownership complications, KeSPA has struggled to 
enforce actions against game developers even with such a broad grant of 
authority.  For example, in 2007, KeSPA sold the television-broadcasting 
rights for StarCraft, one of Blizzard Entertainment’s competitive games, to 
two cable channels without Blizzard Entertainment’s express consent.183  
KeSPA stated that “[i]f a game achieves success as an iconic [esports] 
competition, and the developer pursues profits by declaring that their 
copyright is valid in the [traditional sports] industry as well, then that is a 
large obstacle for [esports’] growth and establishment as a future sports-
entertainment industry.”184  Blizzard Entertainment demanded a higher fee 
for its television broadcasting rights, which KeSPA refused.185  Blizzard 
Entertainment took the case to South Korean courts, stating: 
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from a convergence of structural factors).  
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StarCraft is not a public domain offering, as [Blizzard Entertainment] has 
invested significant money and resources to create the StarCraft game and 
the overall StarCraft universe . . . . 
Classifying StarCraft and other [esports] as part of the public domain 
deprives developers such as [Blizzard Entertainment] of their [intellectual 
property] rights.  There will be no incentive to do what [Blizzard 
Entertainment] had done to balance the games for competition, which is a 
more difficult task than creating a normal game.186 
As a result, Blizzard Entertainment found another broadcast partner, GOM 
TV.187  KeSPA retaliated by threatening to remove professional teams from 
the KeSPA league if those teams appeared in GOM TV events.188  KeSPA 
released a statement that Blizzard Entertainment has a right to a “rational 
level of usage fee”189 and then asserted that KeSPA had the right to a 
licensing fee for running the league and ownership rights over all 
sponsorships, broadcasted programs, and program videos.190  Yet, despite 
KeSPA’s objections, Blizzard Entertainment ended all negotiations with 
KeSPA for any future partnerships in 2010.191  KeSPA maintains that it 
provides value back to game developers through the authorization and 
subsequent legitimization of esports titles—“a kind of KeSPA stamp of 
approval.”192  KeSPA has extensive dominion over esports in South 
Korea,193 but KeSPA lacked sufficient authority over Blizzard 
Entertainment’s proprietary interests. 
B.  United Kingdom 
Western countries lag behind Asian countries in esports regulation, but 
current proposals in the United Kingdom highlight the European Union’s 
approach to esports governance.194  For example, in February 2009, the 
United Kingdom Esports Association (“UKeSA”) was founded as “the 
[United Kingdom’s] official esports governing body” with the mission of 
“working with government, industry, and community to develop, support, 
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encourage, and promote the growth of a professional competitive esports 
framework from an amateur grassroots level upwards.”195  UKeSA failed to 
make promised prize payments and, in December 2009, it issued a final 
notification stating that it had filed for bankruptcy.196 
Following UKeSA’s collapse, the United Kingdom recognized the need 
for independent governance with government support.197  Accordingly, the 
British Esports Association (BEA) was founded on June 30, 2016, as an 
independent governing body under the authority of the United Kingdom 
government.198  In conjunction with the Department for Media, Culture, and 
Sport, the BEA seeks to act as the national governing body for esports in the 
United Kingdom with a focus on “grassroots” community organization.199  
The BEA plans to “help and represent players at all levels; develop a 
grassroots competitive video game scene that will nurture future talent; 
support existing professionals and provide the infrastructure to create future 
British global champions.”200  It has already taken measures by meeting with 
the Department of Culture, Media, and Sport along with several leading game 
publishers.201  The BEA’s successes will be measured by its undertakings in 
2017 and beyond. 
IV.  CALL OF (GOVERNANCE) DUTY:  
CONSIDERATIONS AND PROPOSALS 
Despite the current dominance of Blizzard Entertainment and Riot Games, 
the esports industry has evolved and developed well beyond the contribution 
of any single company.  The composition of professional esports is not a 
result of individual initiatives but comes from a diverse mix of actions, 
 
 195. Goodeh, UKeSA Launches, ESPORTS HEAVEN (Oct. 31, 2008, 6:05 PM), 
http://www.esportsheaven.com/news/view/47606/ukesa-launches [https://perma.cc/H88R-
EG3U]. 
 196. See Richard Lewis, UKeSA Files for Bankruptcy, ESPORTS HEAVEN (Dec. 23, 2009, 
4:28 PM), http://www.esportsheaven.com/news/view/49681/ukesa-files-for-bankruptcy 
[https://perma.cc/U7GV-4MJB]. 
 197. See Callum Leslie, The UK Launches an Official Governing Body for Esports, DOT 
ESPORTS (July 1, 2016, 11:52 AM), https://dotesports.com/general/british-esports-association-
3537 [https://perma.cc/8TJ4-RAX9].  Upon UKeSA’s failure in 2009, an esports commentator 
remarked, 
I still believe esports needs a governing body and in particular one in the [United 
Kingdom], but it needs to be government driven or sponsored [and] must include 
the community at large, not just those wanting to profit from esports.  It will be a 
long time before an organization of this nature can make a profit, but the advantages 
of a combined, rule defining organization on standards in esports would help 
tremendously. 
Tom Souter, E-Sports in the UK, TP REV. (July 23, 2013), http://www.tpreview.co.uk/blog/ 
2013/07/23/esports-in-the-uk/ [https://perma.cc/47Z6-FRVT]. 
 198. Formation of the British Esports Association, BRITISH ESPORTS ASS’N (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.britishesports.org/press-releases.html [https://perma.cc/H4TL-BJWC]. 
 199. See id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. About the British Esports Association, BRITISH ESPORTS ASS’N, 
http://www.britishesports.org/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/S3DX-RA2C] (last visited Oct. 
16, 2017). 
2017] ESPORTS GOVERNANCE 761 
policies, and practices from a range of stakeholders like other game 
developers, tournament organizers, and broadcasters.202 
As evidenced by South Korea and the United Kingdom, governments have 
already begun to regulate the esports industry.203  Interested stakeholders—
from public policy officials down to individual players—seek to situate 
esports into broader conversations about sportsmanship and competitive 
play.204  This last Part proposes and considers two alternatives:  (1) the 
formation of a pan-esports governing body under federal authority and (2) 
the induction into an existing international esports governance organization. 
A.  We All Need Some Regulatory Body to Lean on 
As esports leagues and professional teams continue to form in the United 
States, public regulators should consider forming a national pan-esports 
governing body with sufficient federal authority to curb anticompetitive 
behavior and propagate minimum industry standards to foster competition.205 
1.  Independence by Design 
Since joint-venture and developer-sponsored leagues have historically 
exhibited anticompetitive behavior, esports regulators must consider 
governance that protects consumer demands and stymies anticompetitive 
practices.  Traditional sports joint-venture leagues do not adequately address 
the interests of all stakeholders but,206 instead, tend toward collusive 
practices such as creating geographic artificial scarcity.207  Without rigorous 
market competition, joint ventures do not provide optimal assortment of 
goods and services, to the detriment of consumer welfare.208  Further, 
developer-sponsored leagues may seem like an efficient way to govern 
gameplay of a single game, but they also cause problems.  Whereas control 
in a joint-venture model is spread equally across all franchises,209 teams and 
players within a developer-sponsored league forfeit any control.210  With 
developer-sponsored leagues taking such an active role in shaping esports 
governance,211 the industry runs the risk of promoting developer interests 
over the interests of other stakeholders.212 
Independent governance may mitigate such problems.  This pan-esports 
governing body should avoid creating its own competitions and tournaments 
to ensure independence.213  An independent governing body could determine 
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minimum standards for consumers, players, teams, and leagues.  Such an 
entity would, ideally, be structured with an advisory board of multiple 
stakeholders—such as government regulators representing consumer 
welfare, players’ unions, and professional team owners—to oversee the 
functions of joint-venture and developer-sponsored leagues and to facilitate 
negotiations with esports game developers. 
At the league level, an independent pan-esports governing body can also 
put an end to the “dazzling array of ersatz contests and leagues going off, 
overlapping, and winking out like fireworks displays.”214  By requiring 
preapproval of any competition or league offering money prizes through an 
audit ensuring adequate financing, the governing body can help prevent any 
insolvencies.  All professional joint-venture and developer-sponsored 
leagues should be required to register as member-stakeholders and pay 
membership fees based on year-over-year earnings.  Contractual membership 
agreements could then set forth more permanent benchmark rules of play.215 
At the player level, the governing body, like KeSPA, should mandate 
registration of all esports professional players and,216 additionally, mandate 
the registration of any counterparties that wish to employ or contract with a 
registered player.  Failure to do so should be subject to review, penalty, or 
fines.  If all players and players’ unions are under the purview and protection 
of a pan-esports governing body, then the governing body will have sufficient 
market power to appeal on behalf of its constituents, any exploitative rulings 
or egregious fines imposed by game developers. 
Furthermore, an independent pan-esports governing entity could facilitate 
the negotiation and sale of content-distribution agreements217 or even act as 
a clearinghouse for revenue flows.218  Sales of content-distribution rights 
often involve significant negative externalities and transaction costs219 
because revenue is often contingent on the overall appeal of a game.220  A 
governing body could propagate industry practice standards for balanced 
profit sharing and prohibit long-term exclusive distribution agreements.221 
2.  Federal Support Is Necessary 
UKeSA’s failures,222 in conjunction with the limited successes of 
KeSPA,223 support the notion that federal support and regulatory intervention 
is necessary to ensure the success of a national esports governing body.224  
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Without enforcement authority, a national pan-esports body lacks 
legitimacy.225 
KeSPA’s relative successes in regulating and supporting South Korea’s 
domestic esports industry stems from government backing by South Korea’s 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism.226  Even with this support, KeSPA lacked 
sufficient regulatory power to deal with Blizzard Entertainment.227  Part of 
that difficulty may be attributed to a lack of independence.228  KeSPA 
threatened sanctions as a league organizer, and thus a counterparty—not as a 
governing organization.229  However, without more significant government 
involvement lending legitimacy, it is unlikely that an independent esports 
governing body would gain enough market traction to impact the stakeholder 
actions, compel membership, or enforce sanctions.230 
One potential solution is direct legislation.  By penning the Sports 
Broadcasting Act antitrust exemption, the federal government granted a 
natural monopoly to traditional sports leagues and allowed those leagues to 
flourish and grow.231  The esports industry is unlikely to receive the same 
treatment,232 but other forms of direct legislation may assist the development 
of the esports market.  For example, in 2016, the French Senate implemented 
esports regulations that targeted exploitative fees, ensured prize payments, 
created minimum standards for player contracts, addressed visa issues, and 
established the rights of minors under the age of sixteen.233  The primary 
disadvantage to such direct regulation is that, since the esports industry is 
essentially based online, changes occur quickly.234  The legislative process is 
not anticipatory but often reactionary and likely will not be nimble or flexible 
enough to adapt to new changes and trends in technology and the esports 
market.235  Regardless, the federal government should be prepared to enact 
legislation that promotes basic gaming rights and ethics—like protection for 
minors and player employees—and also supports the legitimacy of a 
domestic esports association. 
Another option is to nest an esports association within a federal agency.  
For example, a domestic esports regulatory authority could be a self-
governing entity under the authority of a federal agency like the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC).236  Since an esports organization often 
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engages in political and business dealings,237 an effective regulatory entity 
should also be granted enforcement and dispute resolution authority.  KeSPA 
insists that its authorization of an esports game is imperative to a game’s 
success in South Korea.238  Despite this argument, Blizzard Entertainment, 
as a private game developer, can choose not to work with KeSPA and 
contract with other companies without KeSPA’s intervention.239  Without 
enforcement authority beyond mere reputational harm, an esports 
organization will have difficulty promulgating rules and standards that all 
stakeholders are willing to heed.  At a minimum, regulators should grant an 
agency like the FCC the authority and power to enforce actions on behalf of 
the esports associations. 
The manifold soft benefits of an independent private-public governance 
organization are hard to quantify.  A domestic pan-esports body would be 
authorized to do the following:  (1) provide an avenue for the community at 
large to combat coercive practices imposed by dominant profit-seeking 
stakeholders, (2) lend stability and reliability to the esports industry, thereby 
attracting capital investment, (3) amplify the concerns of downstream 
consumers and individual player interests, and (4) represent the aligned 
interests of the community at large in legitimizing esports as professional 
sports entertainment.  Governmental support can only contribute further 
legitimacy to these aims while also buttressing the growth of the esports 
industry. 
B.  Join an International Esports Association 
Should the federal government fail to provide adequate authority to a 
domestic pan-esports organization, the body could petition for membership 
in an international esports organization.  Instead of regulating via 
multistakeholder standards-setting procedures and domestic market power, a 
domestic esports organization could largely defer to the regulations and 
sanctions of an international organization like the International e-Sports 
Federation (“IeSF”),240 a South Korea-based global organization, or the 
World Esports Association (“WESA”).241  By joining an international esports 
association, the federal government may receive international pressure to 
grant a domestic governing body much-needed regulatory and enforcement 
authority. 
 
 237. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 240. Member Nations, INT’L E-SPORTS FED’N, http://www.ie-sf.org/about/#member-
nations [https://perma.cc/S76T-N64F] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017); see also TAYLOR, supra 
note 2, at 174 (“International e-Sports Federation was launched in 2008, positioning itself as 
a coordinating organization between member nations (including KeSPA and a number of other 
organizations in Asia and Europe).  One of its main goals is the standardization of esports.”). 
 241. WESA is “the result of joint efforts between industry-leading professional esports 
teams and ESL, the world’s largest esports company.” WESA, http://www.wesa.gg/ 
[https://perma.cc/EE75-VC7B] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) (noting that WESA is open and 
inclusive and seeks to professionalize esports by “introducing elements of player 
representation, standardized regulations, and revenue shares for teams”). 
2017] ESPORTS GOVERNANCE 765 
Joining an international organization has significant advantages, such as 
increased uniformity, sporting ethics, and standardization across all 
constituent countries.  Uniformity will allow esports stakeholders to access 
international markets more readily.  Conversely, by deferring to international 
standards, the United States sacrifices the opportunity to be a norm-maker in 
a rapidly growing global industry.  By joining an international esports 
association, the United States also compromises its ability to protect the 
interests of its own domestic stakeholders, like game developers and 
independent league creators. 
CONCLUSION 
In the United States, the “Wild West” esports market is on the precipice of 
becoming mainstream, with large volumes of revenue soon to follow.  As 
investment into the nascent American esports industry continues to grow, so 
too does the need to address regulatory deficiencies that plague the industry 
on every level—from the largest game developer down to the individual 
consumer.  However, the esports industry cannot simply copy the 
infrastructure and ecosystem that has been built around traditional sports as 
an entertainment form.  Conventional and existing sports-business structures, 
like joint-venture and developer-sponsored leagues, have the tendency to 
skew toward favoring the most dominant stakeholder’s interests at the 
expense of consumer welfare.  Moreover, esports games are subject to more 
complicated intellectual property and antitrust issues. 
Since esports cannot adopt the exact structures of its physical analogues, 
an independent domestic esports governing entity must be formed to 
accommodate rapid growth and create new legal rights or obligations.  
Ideally, an esports organization would have the power to set, promote, and 
enforce regulations on domestic participants across all esports.  While 
oversight is necessary for the esports industry to continue to flourish, such 
oversight must also avoid overreach.  With cautious steering, the United 
States could help chart the future for the esports enterprise. 
